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IDENTIFICATION OF PROPERTY SUBJECT 
TO THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX 
Charles L. B. Lowndes* and Richard B. Stephens** 
ALTHOUGH the federal estate tax is imposed on the "transfer" of property, the amount of the levy is a specified percentage of 
the taxable estate. Correct computation of the tax depends, there-
fore, upon accurate identification of the property included in the 
taxable estate. However, the determination and application of the 
rules governing identification are relatively uncharted areas. 
Three questions must be answered in determining a decedent's 
gross estate: (I) Has there been a taxable transfer, that is, do any of 
the statutory provisions apply so that something is required to be 
included in the gross estate? (2) If a provision is applicable, what is 
the interest that must be included in the gross estate, or how do you 
identify the property includible in the gross estate? (3) Finally, how 
are the interests includible in the gross estate to be valued? Suppose, 
for example, that A transferred Blackacre to Bin contemplation of 
death and died within three years of the transfer. Before A's death, 
B exchanged Blackacre for Whiteacre which B owned at the time of 
A's death. The first question that arises is whether there has been a 
taxable transfer. After this has been decided affirmatively since the 
transfer was made in contemplation of death, the next problem is to 
identify which property is includible in A's gross estate, Blackacre 
or Whiteacre. Finally, it is necessary to determine how to value the 
property included in A's gross estate. 
The statutory definition of the gross estate is quite clear in 
designating the transfers taxed under the statute, but it is often 
disappointing in its failure to identify the property included in the 
gross estate. The definition is cryptic at its best; at its worst, it fails 
to communicate clear messages even to members of the tax cult. In 
the transactions discussed in this article the application of the defi-
nition is encountered at its worst. 
The problem of the identification of the interests includible in 
the gross estate has received far less attention than the questions of 
applicability and valuation. This is probably due to the fact that in 
many instances, once it is decided that a particular transfer is taxed 
under the statute, the subject matter of the transfer is fairly obvious. 
However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that there are a 
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number of situations in which, although it is clear that there has 
been a taxable transfer, it is by no means clear what interests should 
be included in the transferor's gross estate. 
At the outset it is important to notice that identification of the 
property subject to the estate tax is not a single problem, but rather 
a multi-faceted one. In some cases identification requires the deter-
mination of whether there has been a transfer of the specific interest 
whose inclusion in the gross estate is in issue. In other cases identi-
fication of property included in the gross estate turns upon a 
determination of what interest the decedent is considered to have 
transferred. In still other cases, identification depends upon the 
possibility of "tracing" the transferred property into some other 
property or its product. Thus, it will be convenient to consider 
identification of the property included in the gross estate under 
these three headings, namely: (I) Has there been a transfer? (2) 
What has been transferred? and (3) To what extent may the prop-
erty transferred be traced into other property? 
I. HAs THERE BEEN A TRANSFER? 
A. Accumulated Income 
Several cases raise the question whether income accumulated in 
connection with an inter vivos transfer taxable under the estate tax 
should be included in the transferor's gross estate. Since the pro-
visions of the estate tax which are relevant to inter vivas transfers 
apply only to interests transferred by the decedent, the taxability of 
accumulated income depends on whether the decedent transferred 
the income. In this connection it is important to notice that two 
types of transfers are taxed under the estate tax provisions. The first 
are transfers in contemplation of death which are taxed because of 
the transferor's testamentary state of mind, regardless of whether 
the particular transfer was completed during the transferor's life.1 
The second group consists of those inter vivos transfers which are 
not completed until the transferor's death, such as transfers with a 
reservation of a life interest, which are taxed under section 2036, 
transfers taking effect at death, which are taxed under section 2037, 
and revocable transfers, which are taxed under section 2038. 
It appears to be settled that income accumulated in connection 
with an indefeasible transfer in contemplation of death will not be 
taxed as part of the property transferred in contemplation of death, 
because there has been no transfer of the accumulated income.2 
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035. 
2. Commissioner v. Gidwitz' Estate, 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952); Burns v. Com• 
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Since the transferor parted completely with the principal property at 
the time of the original transfer, he never possessed any interest in 
the income which accrued after the transfer and, consequently, he 
could not have transferred such income. 
Before the recent decision of the Supreme Court in United 
States v. O'Malley,3 there was a difference of opinion among the 
lower courts as to whether income accumulated in connection with 
an irrevocable trust, under which the grantor retained power only 
to accumulate income or to distribute it to others, was taxable to 
the grantor's estate under either section 2036(a)(2) or section 2038. 
Section 2036(a)(2) taxes the retention of a power to designate the 
possession or enjoyment of, or the income from, transferred prop-
erty; section 2038, in addition to taxing powers to revoke a transfer, 
taxes powers to alter, amend or terminate the enjoyment of the 
transferred property. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits took the view 
that the accumulated income was not taxable since a decedent who 
lacked the power to revoke the trust and reacquire the income 
could not be said to have made a transfer of accumulated income.~ 
On the other hand, the First Circuit, without closely analyzing the 
question whether the accumulated income could properly be said 
to have been transferred by the decedent, taxed the accumulated 
income primarily on the ground that the retention of the power 
rendered the entire transfer incomplete until the grantor's death.11 
In United States v. O'Malley, the Supreme Court held that there 
was a transfer of the accumulated income which required its inclu-
sion in the transferor's gross estate.6 The Court failed, however, to 
make clear the precise character of this transfer. 
The majority opinion in O'Malley pointed out that in order to 
tax the accumulated income under the 1939 Code equivalent of 
section 2036(a)(2), it was necessary to establish that the decedent 
"retained a power 'to designate the persons who shall possess or 
enjoy the property or the income therefrom;' and second [it had to 
be shmm that] the property sought to be included, namely, the 
portions of the trust principal representing accumulated income, 
was the subject of a previous transfer" by the decedent.7 The Court 
missioner, 177 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1949); Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-l(e) (1958). After refusing 
initially to acquiesce in these decisions, 1949-1 CuM. BuLL. 5, the Commissioner has 
recently changed his position and substituted his acquiescence. Announcement, 1966 
INT. R.Ev. BULL. No. 24, at 6. 
3. 383 U.S. 627 (1966). 
4. O'Malley v. United States, 340 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1964); Michigan Trust Co. v. 
Kavanagh, 284 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1960); Commissioner v. McDermott's Estate, 222 
F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1955). 
5. Round v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964), 
6. 383 U.S. 627, 632-33 (1966). 
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found that the decedent retained power to designate the income 
from the accumulated income because he had power to accumulate 
or distribute this income, and, according to Industrial Trust Co. v. 
Commissioner,8 this amounted to a power to designate the persons 
who shall take income under section 2036(a)(2). The Court then 
proceeded to find that the decedent transferred the accumulated 
income, using the following language which is sufficiently ambigu-
ous to require repetition verbatim: 
The dispute in this case relates to the second condition to the 
applicability of §8ll(c)(l)(B)-whether Fabrice had ever "trans-
ferred" the income additions to the trust principal. Contrary to the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, we are sure that he had. At the 
time Fabrice established these trusts, he owned all of the rights to 
the property transferred, a major aspect of which was his right to 
the present and future income produced by that property .... With 
the creation of the trusts, he relinquished all of his rights to income 
except the power to distribute that income to the income bene-
ficiaries or to accumulate and hold it for the remaindermen of the 
trusts. He no longer had, for example, the right to income for his 
own benefit or to have it distributed to any other than the trust 
beneficiaries. Moreover, with respect to the very additions to prin-
cipal now at issue, he exercised his retained power to distribute or 
accumulate income, choosing to do the latter and thereby adding to 
the principal of the trusts. All income increments to trust principal 
are therefore traceable to Fabrice himself, by virtue of the original 
transfer and the exercise of the power . to accumulate. Before the 
creation of the trusts, Fabrice owned all rights to the property and 
its income. By the time of his death he had divested himself of all 
power and control over accumulated income which had been added 
to the principal, except the power to deal with income from such 
additions. With respect to each addition to trust principal from 
accumulated income Fabrice had clearly made a "transfer" as re-
quired by §8ll(c)(l)(B)(ii). Under that section, the power over in-
come retained by Fabrice is sufficient to require the inclusion of the 
original corpus in his gross estate. The accumulated income added 
to principal is subject to the same power and is likewise in-
cludible .... 9 
There are several conceivable rationalizations of the majority 
opinion in O'Malley. It is possible to conclude that any one of the 
three events mentioned by the Court constituted a taxable transfer 
of the accumulated income. It is also possible, however, that the 
7. Id. at 630. Justices Stewart and Harlan dissented in the O'Malley case. They 
felt that the decedent " 'never made a transfer' of the income which the corpus 
thereafter produced, whether accumulated or not." Id. at 635. 
8. 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947). 
9. 383 U.S. at 632, 633. 
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Court deliberately refrained from pinpointing the precise event 
which constituted the transfer of accumulated income because it 
felt that this was unnecessary; since one or more of the events which 
occurred obviously amounted to a transfer, it may have preferred 
not to specify the exact character of the transfer as long as the deci-
sion of the case before it did not require such specification. These 
alternative possibilities must be considered in any attempt to predict 
the effect of O'Malley upon the course of future decisions. 
The language quoted from O'Malley could be interpreted to 
mean that the decedent transferred the accumulated income when 
he created the trust, since at that time he transferred not only the 
principal of the trust but also the rights to all future income. Apart 
from the fictitious aspect of this transfer, regarding the original 
creation of the trust as a transfer of the future income from the trust 
raises a problem in connection with indefeasible transfers. It seems 
to be conceded, even by the O'Malley Court itself, that income 
accumulated in connection with an indefeasible transfer in con-
templation of death is not subject to the estate tax, because there is 
no taxable transfer of the accumulated income.10 It would appear, 
however, that there would be a transfer of the after accumulated 
income if the original transfer included both principal and future 
income. It is also possible to read the majority opinion as implying 
that the transfer of accumulated income took place when the dece-
dent elected to accumulate the income. One awkward corollary of 
this proposition, if it is sound, is that it would appear that the 
decedent also transferred any income which he elected to distribute. 
This would mean that any income distributed by the decedent 
within three years of his death would be taxable to his estate as a 
transfer in contemplation of death, unless it were proved that the 
distribution was not, in fact, made in contemplation of death.11 
However, there was no suggestion in O'Malley that any income from 
the trust which was distributed before the decedent's death was 
taxable as part of his gross estate. 
An additional possibility is that the Court's language indicates 
that the decedent transferred the accumulated income at his death 
when his power to distribute or accumulate the income from the 
accumulated income lapsed. Apparently, this was the view of the 
10. The majority of the Court distinguished the transfer in O'Malley where the 
transfer was incomplete until the transferor's death from the indefeasible transfers 
in contemplation of death in the Bums and Gidwitz cases. Id. at 633. 
11. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035(b) contains a rebuttable presumption that 
transfers made within 3 years of the transferor's death are transfers made in con-
templation of death. 
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First Circuit in Round v. Commissioner12 when it equated the lapse 
of a power over property with the transfer of the property itself. 
This position may be supported by the O'Malley Court's remark, 
previously quoted, that "[t]he accumulated income added to prin-
cipal is subject to the same power and is likewise includible." How-
ever, the complete context appears to indicate that the O'Malley 
Court thought that the transfer of the accumulated income took 
place before the transferor's death and that the Court was referring 
merely to the fact that the power which constituted a taxable in-
terest existed at the decedent's death. 
As noted above, it is possible that the O'Malley Court refrained 
from pinpointing the event which constituted the transfer of the 
accumulated income so as not to tie the hands of the Court in a 
future case. Although this may be a satisfactory explanation of the 
ambiguous language in the case, it makes it difficult to apply the de-
cision in analogous situations. As_ far as the administration of the 
estate tax and the prediction of future results are concerned, it 
would simplify matters if it could be said with certainty that the 
same "strings" which lead to the inclusion of principal in the estate 
of a decedent will also require inclusion of accumulated income in 
his gross estate when the "strings" are attached to the accumulated 
income. Moreover, control over accumulated income seems to be a 
more equitable basis for a tax than a technical "transfer" of the 
accumulated income. Even though the proper result under the 
statute may be uncertain, the desirable result appears to be quite 
clear. 
It seemed clear before O'Malley that income accumulated in 
connection with a revocable trust was taxable to the grantor's estate. 
Even the Seventh Circuit intimated that a transfer of accumulated 
income would be found in the lapse of the grantor's power to revoke 
the trust and acquire the accumulated income.13 O'Malley is com-
pletely consistent with the taxation to the grantor's estate of income 
accumulated in connection with a revocable trust. If it is possible to 
find a transfer of accumulated income in a situation in which a 
transferor has power to accumulate or distribute, but cannot revest 
such income in himself, there should be no difficulty in finding a 
transfer of accumulated income in those situations in which the 
transferor possesses power to revest the accumulated income in 
12. 332 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964). 
13. In Commissioner v. McDermott's Estate, 222 F.2d 665, 667, 668 (7th Cir. 1955), 
the Court indicated that there would have been a taxable transfer of accumulated 
income if the decedent bad been able to revoke the transfer and acquire the income. 
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himself. Income accumulated in connection with a revocable trust 
might also be taxed to the grantor's estate on the theory that the 
grantor had a power, taxable under section 2041, to appoint the in-
come to himself. If the Regulations are correct in limiting the 
class of taxable powers of appointment to donated, as distinguished 
from reserved, powers,14 a tax under section 2041 would presumably 
be predicated upon the assumption that the decedent did not 
transfer the accumulated income. 
According to O'Malley, income accumulated in connection with 
an irrevocable trust which gives the decedent power to accumulate 
or distribute the income and the income from the accumulated 
income will be taxed to the decedent's estate under section 2036 
(a)(2) and presumably under that part of section 2038 which taxes 
powers to alter, amend or terminate the enjoyment of transferred 
property. The tax, however, must be imposed under section 2036 
(a)(2) or section 2038. The accumulated income could not be taxed 
to the grantor of the trust under section 2041 on the theory that he 
possessed a taxable power of appointment over the income, that is, 
a general power of appointment, since he could not appoint the 
income to himself. Of course, if the position of the Regulations that 
only donated powers are taxed under section 2041 is sound, the 
power would not be taxable under that section in any event if the 
decedent were regarded as having transferred the accumulated 
income. 
The fact that a decedent could only exercise his power to revoke 
a trust or to accumulate or distribute income from a trust with the 
consent of some other person will not prevent the accumulated 
income from being taxed to the decedent's estate, at least if the 
person required to join in the exercise of the power lacked a sub-
stantial adverse interest in the trust. Indeed, in O'Malley the dece-
dent's power to accumulate or distribute the income of the trust was 
a joint power which could only be exercised in conjunction with 
the other trustees of the trust. Suppose, however, that the decedent's 
power over trust income could be exercised only with the consent of 
a person possessing a substantial adverse interest in the income. 
Will this prevent the inclusion of accumulated income in the 
decedent's gross estate? In Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.,15 a trans-
fer which could be revoked by the transferor only with the consent 
14. According to the Regulations "the term 'power of appointment' does not in-
clude powers reserved to the decedent within the concept of sections 2036 through 
2038" but is limited to powers donated to the decedent by some other person. Treas. 
Reg, § 20.2041-l(b)(2) (1958). 
15. 278 U.S. 339 (1929). 
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of a person possessing a substantial adverse interest in the trans-
ferred property was held to be an irrevocable transfer completed 
during the transferor's life which was not taxable to his estate in 
the absence of a provision explicitly taxing such transfers. However, 
after the federal estate tax had been amended to tax expressly trans-
fers revocable by the grantor alone or in conjunction with "any 
other person," the Supreme Court held, in Helvering v. City Bank 
Farmers Trust Co.,16 that "any other person" meant any !)ther per-
son, including persons possessing substantial adverse interests. After 
deciding that as a matter of construction the statute provided for 
the taxation of powers exercisable only in conjunction with a person 
possessing a substantial adverse interest, the Court held that the 
statute was constitutional. In view of City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 
if O'Malley stands for the proposition that the same "strings" which 
will draw principal into a decedent's gross estate will also bind 
accumulated income to his gross estate, all transfers under which 
the transferor possessed power to accumulate or distribute income 
and the income from accumulated income will be fully taxable both 
as to principal and accumulated income, even though the taxable 
power must be exercised in conjunction with a person possessing a 
substantial adverse interest. If this is not the exegesis of the 
O'Malley decision and if the taxation of accumulated income where 
there is a power to revoke a trust or accumulate or distribute in-
come depends upon who can exercise the power, a further complica-
tion, which has plagued both the income tax and gift tax areas, as 
to who possesses a substantial adverse interest in trust property will 
be introduced. 
Although section 2037, like sections 2036 and 2038, limits the 
interests includible in a decedent's gross estate to those interests 
transferred by the decedent during his life, it is generally assumed 
that income accumulated in connection with a transfer which is 
taxable under section 2037 will also be taxed under that section, 
provided, of course, that the transferee's possession or enjoyment of 
the accumulated income is dependent upon his surviving the trans-
feror, and provided further that the transferor possessed the re-
quisite reversionary interest in the accumulated income.17 For ex-
ample, if A transfers property to T in trust to accumulate the 
income from the trust during A's life and at A's death to distribute 
the trust property, along with the accumulated income, to A's sur-
16. 296 U.S. 85 (1935). 
17. This seems to be a fair inference from examples (2) &: (6), Treas. Reg. 
§ 20.2037-l(d) (1958), although both examples deal with a situation in which § 2037 
was held to be inapplicable. 
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viving children, or to A's estate if he has no surviving children, 
apparently the entire trust property, including any accumulated 
income, will be taxed to A's estate if his chance of outliving his 
children was better than five per cent at the date of his death. 
Whether this is a correct construction of section 2037 as far as the 
accumulated income is concerned depends upon whether A made a 
transfer of the accumulated income. One factor mitigating against 
a finding of such a transfer is that the original transfer was an ir-
revocable transfer which put the transferred property beyond the 
transferor's control. The transferee's chance of enjoying the trans-
ferred property depends on his surviving the transferor rather than 
upon any exercise of the transferor's will. There is, however, a trans-
fer of accumulated income in the case of a transfer taxable under 
section 2037 in the sense that at the transferor's death his chance of 
reacquiring the accumulated income lapses. In other words, the 
transferee's possession or enjoyment of the accumulated income is 
held in suspense until the transferor's death. I£ the "strings" over 
accumulated income are equated with the "strings" over principal 
which will incur an estate tax pursuant to the reasoning in O' Malley, 
then income accumulated in connection with a section 2037 trans-
fer appears to be taxable under that section. 
As a matter of policy it seems desirable to equate the "strings" 
which will pull accumulated income into a taxable estate with the 
"strings" which make principal taxable under the estate tax. Thus, 
it might be desirable to amend the statute to prescribe this result 
explicitly instead of hoping that this result will be achieved under 
the vague language of the O' Malley case. 
B. Stock Dividends 
The taxation of stock dividends is a problem that has constantly 
plagued the income tax administrators.18 In recent years the ques-
tion of how stock dividends should be treated under the estate tax 
has arisen in at least three situations. First, where a decedent trans-. 
£erred stock in contemplation of death and before his death a stock 
dividend was distributed to the transferee, the question arose 
whether the stock dividend should be included in the decedent's 
estate along with the original stock.19 A similar question has arisen 
18. See BITIKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 
168-78 (1959). 
19. McGehee v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958). The dividend was 
excluded from the decedent's gross estate because it represented corporate profits ac-
cumulated after the transfer of the stock and was regarded, therefore, as income 
accruing after the transfer. 
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where a decedent owned stock at his death, his executor elected to 
value his estate according to the alternate valuation date, and a 
stock dividend was distributed after the decedent's death but before 
the valuation date.20 Whether the stock dividend should be in-
cluded in the decedent's gross estate depends upon whether the 
stock dividend can be regarded as part of the property owned by 
the decedent at his death.21 Finally, there are several cases in which 
a donee of stock received a stock dividend which was transferred to 
the donor and donee as joint tenants. Upon the death of the donor, 
the question was whether the stock dividend was to be treated as 
part of the original stock and therefore as the contribution of the 
original donor to the joint tenancy, or as income accruing while 
the stock was held by the donee and thus as part of the donee's 
contribution to the joint estate.22 
All of these cases turn on the question whether the stock divi-
dend is a part of the original stock transferred by the decedent (and 
is therefore includible in his gross estate), or, on the other hand, is 
income earned by the original stock after the transfer by the de-
cedent (and is therefore excludible from decedent's gross estate). 
There are various approaches to the problem which are either sug-
gested by or find some support in judicial decisions or Treasury 
Regulations. 
I. The Income Tax Statute 
A possible approach to the treatment of stock dividends under 
the estate tax is to follow the statutory definition of a taxable stock 
dividend which is found in the income tax portion of the Code. 
Stock dividends would then be regarded, for estate tax purposes, as 
part of the stock originally transferred unless they are taxable as 
income. Under the current Code it is expressly provided that stock 
20. Estate of Schlosser v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 268 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 
819 (1960). Since the dividend was not income, as that concept was developed in early 
constitutional cases under the income tax Code, but a division of capital, it was 
included in the gross estate. The Court expressly rejected the rationale of the 
McGehee case, supra note 19. Accord, Rev. Rul. 58-576, 1958-2 Cm,r. BULL. 625. 
21. Income accruing after a decedent's death in connection with property included 
in the gross estate is not includible in the gross estate even though it is valued on the 
alternate valuation date. Maass v. Higgins, 312 U.S. 443 (1941). 
22. Tuck v. United States, 282 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1960); English v. United States, 
270 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1959). Both cases attributed the stock dividends to the donor of 
the original stock upon the ground that the dividends were not "income" as that 
concept was developed in early constitutional cases under the income tax, but 
rather represented earnings of the corporation accumulated before the gift. Neither 
court repudiated the McGehee case. Indeed, it was suggested that a different result 
might be reached where the dividends represented earnings accumulated after the gift, 
a fact not proved by the taxpayer in either case. 
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dividends are not taxable as income unless a stockholder is given 
the option of taking cash or property other than the stock of the 
distributing corporation, or unless the dividend "is made in dis-
charge of preference dividends for the taxable year of the corpora-
tion in which the distribution is made or for the preceding taxable 
year."23 The principal merit in this approach is that it affords a com-
paratively certain and simple rule for handling stock dividends 
under the estate tax. However, the considerations which lead to 
classifying stock dividends as taxable income for income tax pur-
poses have little relevance to the estate tax situation. For example, 
suppose that A transfers stock to B in contemplation of death. After 
the transfer the corporation distributes to B a one hundred per cent 
stock dividend which represents surplus accumulated by the corpo-
ration before the transfer. The stock dividend appears to represent 
part of the stock originally transferred in contemplation of death, 
and as such should be included in the transferor's gross estate. Does 
the fact that the corporation gave the stockholders the option of 
taking cash instead of stock, so that the dividend is taxable as in-
come for income tax purposes have any relevance to the character 
of the dividend for estate tax purposes? 
2. The Constitutional Concept 
Another way of dealing with stock dividends under the estate 
tax is to apply the income tax doctrines developed in connection 
with stock dividends before the 1954 Code; as a matter of general 
legal theory it was then held that only those stock dividends which 
gave the stockholder a different proportional interest in the corpo-
ration were taxable as income.24 The original "common law" ap-
proach had a somewhat closer relationship to the estate tax problem 
than the income tax statutory rule. At least in Eisner v. Macomber, 
the Supreme Court said that a stock dividend was not income when 
the "old certificates have been split up in effect and have diminished 
in value to the extent of the value of the new."25 However, the 
judicial refinements that succeeded Eisner v. Macomber and the 
gradual attrition of the original constitutional approach make the 
income tax doctrines increasingly irrelevant to the estate tax prob-
23. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 305; see BlTIKER, op. cit. supra note 18, at 172-76. 
24. Strassburger v. Commissioner, 318 U.S. 604 (1943): Koshland v. Helvering, 298 
U.S. 441 (1936). This appears to have been the test followed in Estate of Schlosser v. 
Commissioner, 277 F.2d 268 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960), and in Tuck v. 
United States, 282 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1960), and English v. United States, 270 F.2d 876 
(7th Cir. 1959). 
25. 252 U.S. 189, 203 (1920). 
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lems.26 For example, suppose again that A transferred stock to B in 
contemplation of death, and before A's death the corporation dis-
tributed a stock dividend to B. Of what relevance is the fact that 
the dividend did or did :ri.ot affect B's proportional interest in the 
corporation to the question whether the stock dividend really rep-
resents part of the original stock transferred by the decedent? 
If the income tax rule is to be applied to the estate tax, it is 
certainly arguable that the rule which should be carried over is the 
common law rule rather than the statutory rule, since the estate tax 
unlike the income tax contains no explicit definition of an income 
stock dividend.27 On the other hand, the principal argument in 
favor of transposing the income tax rule in this area to the estate 
tax is that it would supply a clear and simple rule for estate tax 
purposes, but the common law income tax test of a taxable stock 
dividend is neither clear nor simple.28 
3. Disregarding the Corporate Entity 
The approach adopted in most of the cases dealing with the 
taxation of stock dividends for estate tax purposes is to look through 
the stock dividend to the earnings capitalized by the dividend.29 To 
the extent that these earnings were accumulated after the date of 
the taxable transfer, the stock dividend is regarded as income ac-
cruing after the transfer and is consequently not includible in the 
decedent's gross estate. To the extent that the stock dividend rep-
resents earnings accumulated before the date of the taxable trans-
fer, it is regarded as part of the property transferred by the decedent. 
26. It is arguable, however, that these decisions rested on the wording of the 
statute, that Eisner v. Macomber, supra note 25, in which the court held that a stock 
dividend of common on common is not income in the constitutional sense, may no 
longer be the law, and that perhaps now any stock dividend is constitutionally tax-
able as income. See Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943); Lowndes, The Taxation 
of Stock Dividends and Stock Rights, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 147, 149 (1947). 
27. In Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947), where the 
question was what the income tax section of the Code meant by a "gift", the court 
refused to read the definition from the gift tax section into the income tax section 
and, in the absence of an income tax definition, adopted the common-law definition 
of a gift. 
28. Furthermore, the Eisner v. Macomber test may not have been the "common-
law" test of a taxable stock dividend at all, if that case was incorrectly decided. If 
Eisner was incorrectly decided, any stock dividend is taxable as income. 
29. This was the position adopted by the Fifth Circuit in McGehee v. Commis-
sioner, 260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958) and it would apparently be followed by the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits according to their somewhat equivocal decisions in English 
v. United States, 270 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1959) and Tuck v. United States, 282 F.2d 405 
(9th Cir. 1960). On the other hand, the Third Circuit, in Estate of Schlosser v. Com-
missioner, 277 F.2d 268 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960), expressly iepucliated 
this approach. 
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However, there are several difficulties with this approach. First, it 
postulates an ability to identify the source of the stock dividend 
which is simpler in theory than it is in practice. This solution is 
reminiscent of the apportionment rule under the law of Trusts, ac-
cording to which stock dividends were divided between the income 
beneficiary and remainderman of a trust depending upon the time 
when the earnings represented by the stock dividends were accu-
mulated.30 This rule proved so difficult to administer in connection 
with trusts that it has generally been abandoned in favor of the 
simpler and less equitable practice of allocating all stock dividends 
to corpus. Furthermore, if stock dividends are to be treated as part 
of the property originally transferred by a decedent to the extent 
that they represent earnings accumulated before the transfer, it is 
difficult to see why all dividends should not be apportioned in this 
fashion. If the corporate veil is pierced to determine what earnings 
are represented by a stock dividend, why should this not be done 
in connection with any dividend? The authors of the Regulations 
recognize that the problem of determining whether a ·corporate 
dividend represents part of the stock originally transferred or in-
come accruing after the transfer goes beyond stock dividends, al-
though they are better at recognizing the problem than at offering 
practical advice for its solution. Section 20.2032-l(d)(4) of the Regu-
lations provides that when an estate is valued according to the 
alternate valuation date: 
ordinary dividends out of earnings and profits (whether in cash, 
shares of the corporation, pr other property) are "excluded prop-
erty" and are not to be valued [that is, included in the gross estate] 
under the alternate valuation method. If, however, dividends are 
declared to stockholders of record after the date of the decedent's 
death with the effect that the shares of stock at the subsequent 
valuation date do not reasonably represent the same "included 
property" of the gross estate as existed at the date of the decedent's 
death, the dividends are "included property," except to the extent 
that they are out of the earnings of the corporation after the date 
of the decedent's death. For example, if a corporation makes a dis-
tribution in partial liquidation to stockholders of record during the 
alternate valuation period which is not accompanied by a surrender 
of a stock certificate for cancellation, the amount of the distribution 
received on stock included in the gross estate is itself "included 
property," except to the extent that the distribution was out of 
earnings and profits since the date of the decedent's death. Similarly, 
if a corporation, in which the decedent owned a substantial interest 
and which possessed at the date of the decedent's death accumu-
30. See 3 Scorr, TRUSTS 1813-21 (2d ed. 1956). 
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lated earnings and profits equal to its paid-in capital, distributed all 
of its accumulated earnings and profits as a cash dividend to share-
holders of record during the alternate valuation period, the amount 
of the dividends received on stock includible in the gross estate will 
be included in the gross estate under the alternate valuation 
method. Likewise, a stock dividend distributed under such circum-
stances is "included property." 
The Regulations suggest a flexible standard to solve the prob-
lem of determining when corporate dividends distributed after a 
transfer of stock represent part of the original stock that was trans-
ferred. The suggested standard rejects the income tax approach in 
favor of a modified chronological earnings approach. First of all, 
the Regulations distinguish between ordinary dividends and other 
dividends, which is, of course, easier to do in theory than it is in 
practice, since no one has yet charted a clear line between ordinary 
and extraordinary dividends. Ordinary dividends, whether they 
take the form of cash dividends, stock dividends or dividends in 
kind, are regarded as income, rather than as a division of the origi-
nal stock, irrespective of when the earnings represented by the 
dividends were accumulated. Apart from ordinary dividends, the 
classification of corporate distributions as part of the stock origin-
ally transferred or as income accruing after the transfer turns upon 
whether as a result of the distribution the original stock represents 
the same property as it did when the stock was transferred. The 
Regulations thus come closer to stating an objective than to for-
mulating a practical test. Moreover, even if the distribution alters 
the character of the transferred stock it will still, according to the 
Regulations, be treated as income to the extent it represents cor-
porate earnings after the date of the transfer, which means, of 
course, that it will still be necessary to identify the source of the 
distribution. 
The Treasury apparently rejects the income tax test of an in-
come dividend not only in connection with stock dividends, but in 
connection with other dividends as well. Thus, for example, the 
distribution in partial liquidation which the Regulations treat as 
a division of capital or, in other words, as part of the stock originally 
transferred, would be taxed for income tax purposes as ordinary in-
come, since it was not accompanied by any redemption of the 
stockholder's stock.31 
The present statute does not attempt to deal explicitly with the 
31. See :Beretta v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1944); :BITIKER, op. cit. 
supra note 23, at 219. 
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estate tax problems arising out of corporate distributions. It is very 
doubtful, moreover, whether it affords any basis for administrative 
or judicial development of a clear and workable set of answers to 
these problems. This is an area where legislative intervention ap-
pears desirable. Congress should explore the possibilities of adapt-
ing the concepts developed in connection with the taxation of 
corporate distributions under the income tax section of the Code 
to the estate tax section.32 It seems likely, however, that the only 
satisfactory solution to the estate tax problems outlined above will 
be some arbitrary rule declaring that distributions in excess of a 
stated percentage, such as ten per cent, of the value of the stock 
within a prescribed period of time, such as a year, shall, to the ex-
tent of such excess, be regarded as part of the original stock. The 
legislation would be based generally upon the premise that a cor-
porate distribution which changes the character of stock should be 
regarded for estate tax purposes as part of the original stock. This 
ideal would be embodied in an arbitrary mathematical formula in 
the absence of a more equitable but equally workable form of ex-
pression. 
In this discussion it has been assumed that the stock dividend 
whose inclusion in the gross estate was in question was a dividend 
distributed in connection with a complete irrevocable transfer of 
stock, that is, a transfer in which the only basis for taxing the divi-
dend was that it represented part of the stock originally transferred. 
Stock dividends distributed in connection with transfers which 
would result in the inclusion in the transferor's estate of accumu-
lated income from such transfers at least to the extent that the in-
come is accumulated rather than distributed, appear clearly to be 
taxable whether they represent part of the property originally trans-
ferred or income accumulated after the transfer. For example, sup-
pose that A transferred stock to T in trust for C for life, remainder 
to D, and empowered T to accumulate any income from the trust 
during C's life. Suppose further that the trust is revocable by A, 
32. It is doubtful whether the income tax distinctions between corporate distribu-
tions which are and which are not taxable as income have any real relevance to the 
estate tax. We have already seen that income tax analogies are not particularly helpful 
in determining how the estate tax should treat stock dividends. It seems that the 
estate tax should not adopt the income tax tests of an income dividend in connection 
with other types of corporate distributions. For example, a distribution in redemp-
tion of stock or in partial liquidation of a corporation will be treated as ordinary 
income rather than a capital distribution unless it meets the requirements laid down 
in § 302 or §§ 331 and 346 of the Code. But whether the dividend is treated as ordi-
nary income or as a capital distribution under the income tax has no bearing upon 
whether it represents part of the stock in connection with which the distribution was 
made and which is deemed transferred for purposes of the estate tax. 
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that before A's death stock dividends are received by the trust, and 
that T adds them to corpus. It is clear that these dividends, along 
with the other trust property, will be taxed to A's estate whether 
they represent part of the stock originally transferred to the trustee 
or income accumulated after that transfer. 
II. WHAT DID THE DECEDENT TRANSFER? 
A. Transfers in Contemplation of Death 
In some cases it is clear that the decedent made a taxable trans-
fer, but the amount to be included in his gross estate is obscured 
by doubt as to what he transferred. United States v. Allen38 is an 
excellent illustration of this problem. For a simplified version of 
the facts in Allen, suppose that A transferred Blackacre to B but 
retained a life estate in the property. Suppose also that A later 
relinquished the life estate to B in contemplation of death. If A 
dies within three years of this relinquishment, what will be in-
cluded in his gross estate? The answer to this question appears to 
depend on what interest A transferred in contemplation of death. 
As a preliminary point it seems fairly certain that nothing can 
be included in A's estate under section 2036. Although the literal 
wording of section 2036 imposes a tax whenever there has been a 
transfer with a retention of a life interest, without regard to 
whether the life interest persists until the decedent's death, it seems 
to be fairly well settled that a tax cannot be imposed under section 
2036 if the decedent divested himself of all interest in the trans-
ferred property before his death.34 If Blackacre is to be taxed to A's 
estate, it must be taxed under section 2035, which covers property 
transferred in contemplation of death. However, section 2035 pro-
vides that "[t]he value of the gross estate shall include the value of 
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the de-
cedent has at any time made a transfer . . . in contemplation of 
death." Consequently, the critical question is what interest did A 
33. 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961). 
34. Rev. Rul. 56-324, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 999; Estate of Thurston, 36 Cal. 2d 207, 
223 P.2d 12 (1950); Robert J. Cuddihy, 32 T.C. 1171 (1959). In United States v. Allen, 
supra note 33, at 918, Judge Breitenstein, concurring, declared that § 2036 taxes a 
transfer with a reservation of a life interest, regardless of what happens to the life 
interest after the transfer: "As I read the statute, the tax liability arises at the time 
of the inter vivos transfer under which there was a retention of the right to income 
for life. The disposition thereafter of that retained right does not eliminate the tax 
liability." Although Judge Breitenstein's contention finds support in the literal lan-
guage of § 2036, it is unlikely that it will be followed, since it goes against the 
underlying philosophy of the estate tax, which seeks to tax the transmission of 
property at death. 
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transfer in contemplation of death. If the interest that A transferred 
was her property interest, that is, her life estate, then nothing would 
be included in her gross estate, because the transferred interest 
must be valued according to its worth at A's death or upon the al-
ternate valuation date. At either date, A's life estate would be value-
less. The difficulty with this position, which was accepted by the 
district court in Allen35 and rejected by the Tenth Circuit on ap-
peal, is that it reaches an undesirable result. The purpose of in-
cluding transfers in contemplation of death in a decedent's taxable 
estate is to prevent the decedent from avoiding the estate tax by 
means of such a transfer. It would seem, therefore, that the transfer 
should be ignored for tax purposes and the transferor's estate 
should be taxed as if the transfer had not taken place.36 It is possible 
to achieve this result if the interest transferred by the decedent in 
contemplation of death is regarded as the interest which is attrib-
uted to him under the estate tax before the transfer. In other words, 
before the transfer in contemplation of death, the full value of 
Blackacre was tax.able to A's estate; A was for tax purposes regarded 
as the owner of Blackacre. Since A should not be able to divest him-
self of this mmership for tax purposes by means of a transfer in 
contemplation of death, his release of the life estate in Blackacre 
should be regarded as a transfer of Blackacre itself, rather than a 
mere life estate. This is the way the Tenth Circuit analyzed the 
transfer in contemplation of death in Allen. 
Actually, there was a further twist in Allen because when the 
decedent released her life estate she received as consideration for 
the release the value of the life estate. Her executors therefore 
argued that she had not made a tax.able transfer because she had 
received adequate and full consideration for the release. Whether 
the consideration was adequate depends upon what was transferred. 
If the decedent merely transferred her life estate, there was ade-
quate consideration for the transfer, whereas if the decedent is 
deemed to have transferred the whole of Blackacre in contemplation 
of death, then there obviously was only partial consideration for the 
transfer, and under sections 2035 and 2043 the full value of Black-
acre less the value of the consideration received for the release of 
the life estate should be included in the decedent's gross estate.87 
35. 6 AM. FED. TAX R.2d 6128 (D. Colo. 1960); see 33 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 103 (1960). 
36. "For the purposes of the tax, property transferred by the decedent in con• 
templation of death is in the same category as it would have been if the transfer had 
not been made and the transferred property had continued to be owned by the 
decedent up to the time of his death." Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704, 711 
(5th Cir. 1935). 
37. Apart from transfers in contemplation of death, there are other situations in 
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Allen raises a question which goes beyond the court's decision, 
since the decision simply covers one aspect of the tax consequences 
of relinquishing in contemplation of death the taxable incidents 
of a transfer which is taxable under the estate tax. For example, 
suppose that A makes a transfer which is taxed under section 2037 
as a transfer taking effect at A's death and subsequently relinquishes 
his reversionary interest in contemplation of death. What should 
be included in A's gross estate: the value of his reversionary interest 
or the amount which would have been included in his gross estate 
if the relinquishment had not taken place? Obviously, if the reason-
ing of Allen is applied, the amount included in A's gross estate will 
be the same amount that would have been taxable to his estate if 
the relinquishment had not taken place. This problem is simplified 
whenever a taxable power to alter or amend the enjoyment of trans-
ferred property is released in contemplation of death, because sec-
tion 2038 expressly provides that the amount which shall be taxable 
to the decedent's estate is that which would have been taxable if 
the relinquishment had not taken place. In fact, the express pro-
vision in section 2038 upon this point makes one wonder whether 
the statute carries the negative inference that a different result 
should be reached in those cases in which taxable incidents covered 
by other sections are released in contemplation of death. 
Most of the cases in this area have arisen from situations involv-
ing a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety who has contributed all 
of the consideration for jointly held property and who has subse-
which the adequacy of the consideration for a transfer turns upon what was trans• 
ferred. For example, suppose that upon her husband's death a wife transfers her 
community property to a trust for herself for life, remainder to her children, in 
return for a life estate in her husband's share of the community property. Assume 
that the value of the remainder in the community property transferred by the wife to 
her children is $100,000, the total value of her share of the community property is 
$200,000, and the value of the life estate in her husband's share of the community 
property, which she received from the husband, is $100,000. At the wife's death the 
government contends that her share of the community property is taxable to her 
estate under § 2036 upon the theory that she transferred her interest in the com-
munity property during her life with a reservation of the income from the property 
for life. The wife's estate contends that such transfer is not taxable because it was a 
transfer for an adequate and full consideration. Obviously whether there was a 
transfer of the wife's share of the community property for an adequate consideration 
depends upon what she transferred. If she transferred only the remainder interest 
after her retained life estate, then she has made a transfer for an adequate con-
sideration. If, however, as the Fifth Circuit held in Vardell's Estate v. Commissioner, 
307 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962), the wife is deemed to have transferred the interest which 
would have been taxable to her estate under § 2036 if there had been no considera· 
tion, then she must be treated as having conveyed the fee in the property for a life 
estate in her husband's property, and the excess of the value of her share of the com• 
munity property over the value of the life estate in her husband's share of the com• 
munity property is taxable to her estate. 
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quently transferred his interest in the joint property in contempla-
tion of death. There are a substantial number of cases in which 
such transfers have been viewed as transfers in contemplation of 
death of the property interest which the decedent owned in the 
common property and in which it has been held that only the de-
decent's interest in the property can be included in his estate.88 In 
other words, if A purchased Blackacre and took title in A and B as 
joint tenants, and later transferred in contemplation of death his 
half of the property to X, these cases indicate that only the half of 
the property which A owned and transferred is taxable to his estate. 
The Treasury originally took this position in the proposed regu-
lations under the 1954 Code, 39 but later retreated, 40 and in view of 
Allen41 will doubtless now contend that the entire property is tax-
able to A's estate on the theory that for tax purposes he was the 
owner of the entire property and transferred the entire property in 
contemplation of death. 
Several cases raise the interesting question of the tax effects of 
an inter vivos transfer by a joint tenant to whom the entire prop-
erty would be taxable under section 2040, when the inter vivos 
transfer is taxable under the estate tax for some reason other than 
that the transfer was made in contemplation of death. For example, 
in the recent decision of Heasty v. United States,42 Mr. Creekmore 
and his wife held as joint tenants property which had been pur-
chased by Mr. Creekmore. They transferred this property to be 
held in trust for their daughters and grandchildren reserving joint 
and survivor life estates to themselves. Mrs. Creekmore died in 1952 
and her husband died in 1960. The Commissioner included the 
full value of the trust property in his estate but the district court, 
granting a refund, held that only half of the property was taxable 
to Mr. Creekmore's estate under section 2036 because he trans-
ferred only half of the property· to the trust. The district court 
38. Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949); D. M. Brockway, 
18 T.C. 488 (1952), afj'd., 219 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1954); cf. Baltimore Nat'l Bank v. 
United States, 136 F. Supp. 642 (D. Md. 1955); Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. 654 (1955); A. 
Carl Borner, 25 T.C. 584 (1955). Contra, Harris v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 736 (D. 
Neb. 1961). 
39. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-l(d), 21 Fed. Reg. 7879 (1956). 
40. Although the regulations in final form contain no reference to the transfer of 
jointly held property in contemplation of death, they do provide that the release in 
contemplation of death of taxable incidents in connection with transfers taxable 
under§§ 2036, 2037, and 2038 will not prevent the imposition of the same taxes which 
would have been imposed if the release had not taken place. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-l(b) 
(1958). Moreover, the Treasury has withdrawn its acquiescences in the Brockway, 
Borner and Carnall cases. Announcement, 1962 INT. REv. BULL. No. 20, at 7. 
41. See Harris v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 736 (D. Neb. 1961); note 33 supra. 
42. 239 F. Supp. 345 (D. Kan. 1965). 
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rejected the Government's argument that it should apply the rea-
soning of Allen and, since the transfer to the trust was taxable 
under section 2036, that it should disregard the transfer for tax 
purposes and tax Mr. Creekmore's estate as though he had held the 
property in joint tenancy with his wife at his death. The court 
drew a distinction between a transfer in contemplation of death 
and other taxable inter vivos transfers, declaring that if Allen did 
apply it was up to the Tenth Circuit to apply it. The Heasty court 
found support for this position in Glaser v. United States,43 a case 
in which the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion on simi-
lar facts. On the other hand, if the joint tenants convey the jointly 
owned property to a revocable trust, there is authority for disregard-
ing the transfer because the trust is revocable and for including the 
property, as though it were held in joint tenancy, in the estate of 
the tenant who contributed the consideration for the property.44 
Another interesting problem arises when an insured assigns his 
life insurance in contemplation of death more than three years be-
fore his death and continues to pay' premiums on the insurance up 
until the date of his death. Assuming that the assignment com-
pletely divested the insured of any incidents of ownership in the 
insurance, the proceeds of the insurance cannot be taxed to his 
estate under section 2042. Nor may the proceeds of the policy be 
taxed to his estate under section 2035, because that section provides 
that a transfer more than three years before the transferor's death 
cannot be taxed as a transfer in contemplation of death. However, 
it would appear that the premium payments made by the insured 
within three years of his death should be taxed as transfers in con-
templation of death. The problem is how to compute the amount 
43. 306 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1962). Contra, Rev. Rul. 57-448, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 618. 
44. Estate of W. M. Hornor v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1942). But see 
Estate of J. C. Hornor v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1962). The forthright 
solution for the problems discussed in the text lies in legislation. It should not be 
possible to escape the estate tax by a release in contemplation of death of the incidents 
of an inter vivos transfer which make the transfer taxable under the provisions of 
estate tax. The sections providing for the taxation of such transfers should be amended 
to provide, as § 2038 does, that relinquishment in contemplation of death of the inter-
ests which make the transfers taxable under those sections will not affect the taxes im-
posed under those sections. The basic difficulty here is that the overall policy and 
the literal language of the statute conflict with each other. The result is needless 
litigation in which the cou,rts feel compelled to strain the statutory language to 
achieve desirable results. One of the authors of this paper feels that there is merit in 
a strict interpretation of the statute, such as that adopted in the Heasty and Glaser 
cases, rather than the kind of judicial rescue operation typified by the Allen decision, 
293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961), on the theory that strict 
interpretation may prompt Congressional action. 
November 1966] Federal Estate Tax 125 
which should be included in the decedent's gross estate. The tax 
should only be levied upon the premium payments themselves, 
since the insured only transferred these premiums within the three-
year period. Indeed, since he irrevocably divested himself of the 
insurance policy before the three-year period commenced, these 
premiums were the only things which he was capable of transfer-
ring. It has been suggested on the basis of Liebmann v. Hassett45 
that a part of the insurance proceeds proportionate to the part of 
the premiums paid by the decedent within three years of his death 
should be included in his gross estate.46 It is difficult, however, to 
see any justification for this position. It would seem to be obvious 
that the decedent could not have made a transfer of a proportionate 
part of the life insurance policy within three years of his death if 
he had completely divested himself of all interest in the insurance 
before the three year period. Furthermore, Liebmann does not sup-
port the suggested position. In that case a man transferred life in-
surance to his wife in contemplation of death, and no provision 
such as the current three-year cutoff prevented the imposition of 
estate tax on the transfer. After the transfer the wife paid several 
premiums on the policy and the court held, upon the death of the 
insured, that the part of the proceeds proportionate to the premi-
ums paid by the wife should be excluded from the husband's gross 
estate. The court analogized the payment of premiums by the wife 
after the transfer of the policy to her in contemplation of death to 
improvements made by a transferee to property transferred to him 
in contemplation of death, the value of which are excluded from 
the transferor's gross estate. Whether or not this analogy is sound, 
Liebmann obviously does not say that when an insured pays pre-
miums on an insurance policy after he has completely divested him-
self of any interest in the policy, he transfers a proportionate part 
of the policy. When the assignee in Liebmann paid the premiums, 
she was the owner of the policy. Consequently, it may have been 
logical to regard these payments as her contribution to the insur-
ance proceeds, and therefore analogous to a transferee's improve-
ments. Nevertheless, Liebmann has no real bearing on the problem 
involved in the hypothetical situation in which premium payments 
are made on an insurance policy by a person who has no interest in 
the policy. 
45. 50 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1943), aff d., 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945). 
46. See LOWNDES&: KRAMER, FEDERAL EsTATES AND GIFr TAXES 287 (2d ed. 1962). 
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B. Transfer with Retained Life Interest 
Apparently section 2036 does not impose a tax upon a transfer 
in which a life estate is retained unless the transferor's life interest 
persists until his death.47 However, the amount included in the 
gross estate under section 2036 is not limited to the value of the 
decedent's retained interest, but rather extends to the entire in-
terest he transferred during his life in connection with which he 
retained the life interest.48 For example, if A transfers Blackacre to 
B but retains a life estate, at A's death the full value of Blackacre, 
as distinguished from the value of his retained estate, will be in-
cluded in A's gross estate. 
An exception is made to the rule that the full value of the prop-
erty transferred by the decedent during his life is included in his 
gross estate pursuant to section 2036 if the decedent retained only a 
contingent life estate after granting to another a life estate which is 
still outstanding at the decedent's death. In such a case the value of 
the life estate anterior to the decedent's is excluded from the dece-
dent's gross estate on the theory that this interest in the property 
was not subject to the decedent's retained interest. Thus, for ex-
ample, if A granted Blackacre to B for life, then· to A for life, then 
to D in fee, and if A predeceased B, the value of Blackacre less the 
value at A's death of B's outstanding life estate would be included 
in A's gross estate.49 There is no obvious reason why if more than 
one life estate preceding the decedent's life estate is outstanding at 
the decedent's death, the value of all preceding life estates should 
not be excluded from the decedent's gross estate. Nevertheless, the 
Regulations limit the scope of the exclusion to the preceding in-
terests that are "actually being enjoyed" at the decedent's death.50 
Thus, if A granted Blackacre to B for life, then to C for life, then 
to A for life, then to D in fee, and if A died survived by B and C, 
only the value of B's life estate would be subtracted from the value 
of Blackacre includible in A's gross estate. If challenged, this in-
terpretation might properly be rejected by the courts. 
Section 2036(a)(2) provides for the imposition of a tax where a 
decedent transferred property and, instead of reserving the posses-
47. See note 34 supra. 
48. Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947). Of course, 
if the decedent retained a life interest in only part of the property, only this part is 
included in his gross estate. See LOWNDES &: KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 46, at 158. 
49. Marks v. Higgins, 213 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Nathan, 159 
F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948); Herman Hohensee, 25 T.C. 
1258 (1956). 
50. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-l(a) (1960). See also Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-l(b)(ii) (1960). 
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sion or enjoyment of the property directly, retained a power (either 
alone or in conjunction with any person) to designate the possession 
or enjoyment of the property. For the purpose of determining the 
amount includible in the gross estate under section 2036(a)(2), the 
power to designate possession or enjoyment of the transferred prop-
erty is equated to the direct reservation of possession or enjoyment 
of the property. That is, section 2036 (a)(2) is interpreted as requir-
ing the inclusion in the decedent's estate of the full value of the 
property to which that power attaches rather than merely the value 
of the power retained by the decedent. Thus, for example, if A 
transferred property to T in trust for C for life, remainder to D in 
fee, and if A retained power to direct the trustee to accumulate the 
income from the trust property, the full value of the trust property, 
not merely the value of the income subject to A's retained power, 
will be included in A's gross estate.51 
C. Revocable Transfers 
Section 2038 taxes a transfer made by a decedent during his life-
time if the enjoyment of the transferred interest is subject to alter-
ation, amendment, revocation or termination at the decedent's 
death by virtue of a power exercisable by the decedent either alone 
or in conjunction with any other person. Although most of the 
transfers which are taxable under section 2038 are also taxable un-
der section 2036(a)(2), the amount against which the tax is levied 
under section 2038 is limited to the property interest actually sub-
ject to the power, unlike the amount included in the decedent's 
gross estate under section 2036-the value of the property trans-
ferred by the decedent in connection with which he reserved the 
power. For example, suppose that A transferred property to T in 
trust for C for life, remainder to D, and retained a power to substi-
tute another beneficiary to receive the trust income during C's life. 
If A dies survived by C, both section 2036 and section 2038 apply 
to the transfer. Under section 2036(a)(2), since A retained a power 
to designate the income from the trust for a period which did not in 
fact end before his death, the full value of the trust property is in-
cludible in his gross estate. However, under section 2038 only the 
value of the interest subject to A's power, that is, the value of C's 
life estate, would be included in A's gross estate. Since these alter-
nate sections produce such different results it is quite clear which 
one the government will seek to apply. 
51. Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947); Treas. Reg. 
§ 20.2036-l(a) (1960). 
128 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:105 
Although it seems settled that under section 2038 the interest 
subject to the power at the decedent's death is the basis upon which 
the amount includible in his gross estate is determined, it is not al-
ways easy to define precisely the scope of that interest. For example, 
suppose that A transferred property to T in trust, the terms of the 
trust being to pay C the income from the trust property during C's 
life and at C's death to pay over the trust property to D and his 
heirs. Suppose also that A retained a power to terminate the trust 
at any time during C's life and to direct the trustee to pay over the 
trust property to C free and clear of the trust. If A predeceases C, 
what amount should be included in A's gross estate? It is arguable 
that only the value of D's remainder should be taxed to A's estate, 
since A could not in any event deprive C of the enjoyment of the 
property during his life.52 However, according to the statute a tax 
is due when the decedent possessed at his death a power to "change" 
the "enjoyment" of the transferred property. It would appear that 
C's enjoyment will be changed if his interest as an income bene-
ficiary is converted into that of an owner in fee simple. Although 
the point may not have been squarely in issue in Lober v. United 
States,53 the Supreme Court implied in its decision in that case that 
the full value of the trust property would be taxed to the decedent's 
estate in the hypothetical situation. 
In Commissioner v. Hager's Estate/'4 A during his life trans-
ferred property to T in trust for B for life, remainder to C in fee. A 
retained a power to accumulate the income from the trust during 
B's life and add it to the remainder. The Third Circuit held that 
the remainder as well as the life estate was taxable to A's estate un-
der section 2038. The correctness of that decision is doubtful. The 
decedent did not have a power to change the enjoyment of the re-
mainder; he could merely create an additional remainder interest. 
It would appear that the original remainder should not be included 
in A's gross estate, and apparently the case was finally compromised 
on appeal on this basis. 55 
52. Cf. In re Inman's Estate, 203 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1953). 
53. 346 U.S. 335 (1953). 
54. 173 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1949). 
55. Covey, The Klauber Case and Sections 2036(a)(l), 2037 and 2038 of the 1951-
Code, 5 TAX CouNs. Q. 129 (1961) makes this comment about the Hager case: 
The decision was in error for in no event did decedent retain a power to affect 
the enjoyment of the original principal of the trust. This fact is reflected by the 
subsequent proceedings in the case itself. It was settled during the pendency of 
the estate's petition for certiorari on the basis of the value of the trust at the 
decedent's death reduced by the original principal of the trust being included in 
decedent's gross estate. 
Id. at 164. 
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D. Transfers Taking Effect at Death 
Section 2037 taxes a transfer by a decedent during his lifetime 
as a transfer taking effect at death if the transferee's possession or 
enjoyment of the transferred property is dependent upon his sur-
viving the transferor and if the transferor retained a reversionary 
interest in the property the value of which reversionary interest im-
mediately before the decedent's death exceeded five per cent of the 
value of the transferred property. Although retention by the de-
cedent of a reversionary interest until his death is a prerequisite for 
the imposition of a tax under section 2037, the amount included 
in the decedent's gross estate is not limited to the value of the re-
versionary interest that lapses at his death, but rather extends to 
the full value of the property which was transferred by the decedent 
during his life and which meets the survivorship and reversionary 
interest requirements.66 However, only property interests that meet 
both the survivorship and reversionary interest requirements are 
included in the decedent's gross estate under section 2037. Thus, if 
A transferred property to Tin trust for C for life, remainder to C's 
surviving children, with remainder in default of such children to A 
or A's estate, nothing would be taxed to A's estate under section 
2037 as a result of the trust, since the possession or enjoyment of 
the beneficiaries was not dependent upon their surviving A. C is 
entitled to enjoy the property as long as he lives, whether or not he 
survives A. C's children are entitled to possess the property if they 
survive C, whether or not they survive A. 57 Of course, the fact that 
property is not ta.xable under section 2037 does not mean that it 
may not be taxed under some other section of the statute. In the 
hypothetical case, for example, although nothing will be taxed to 
A's estate under section 2037, the value of A's reversionary interest 
in the transferred property will be ta.xed to his estate under section 
2033 as property in which he owned at his death an inheritable 
interest. 
56. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108 (1945); Commis-
sioner v. Estate of Field, 324 U.S. 113 (1945). 
57. Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-l(e), Example (1) (1958). If only part of the property 
meets the survivorship and the reversionary interest requirements, only that part of 
the property is includible in the decedent's gross estate. For example, if H trans-
ferred property to ·w for life, remainder to H if he survived W, and remainder to X 
if H did not survive W, and if H died survived by W, only the value of the trans-
ferred property less the value of W's life estate (which is in no way dependent on her 
surviving H) at H's death would be included in H's gross estate. Id., examples (3) &: (4). 
See also Arthur Klauber, 34 T.C. 968 (1960). 
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E. Transfers for Insufficient Consideration 
Generally, only gratuitous inter vivas transfers are taxed under 
the estate tax, since the purpose of the tax is to reach donative 
transactions rather than sales or exchanges. Thus, "a bona fide sale 
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth" 
is expressly exempted from the taxes imposed pursuant to sections 
2035 through 2038. Moreover, section 2043 provides that with re-
spect to transfers for less than adequate consideration "there shall 
be included in the gross estate only the excess of the fair market 
value at the time of death of the property otherwise to be included 
on account of such transaction, over the value of the consideration 
received therefor by the decedent." 
In those situations in which there is a transfer for an insufficient 
consideration, a problem is presented as to what part of the transfer 
is gratuitous and what part of the transfer is not taxable because it 
is for a consideration. It would appear that the equitable approach 
would be to handle the transfer on a proportional basis and to re-
gard it as if it were two transfers: one, a transfer of part of the prop-
erty equal in value to the value of the consideration-a nontaxable 
transfer for adequate consideration; the other, a completely gratu-
itous transfer of the remainder of the property. Thus, if A in con-
templation of death transferred stock worth $100,000 in return for 
land worth $25,000, and A died within three years of this transfer, 
at which time the stock was worth $200,000 and the land was worth 
$40,000, only $150,000 would be included in his gross estate with 
respect to the stock. The theory would be that A transferred one-
fourth of the stock (the part proportionate to the value of the con-
sideration) for adequate consideration and the remaining three-
fourths gratuitously. In this situation, although the part of the 
property transferred gratuitously would be valued according to its 
fair market value at the decedent's death or at the alternate valua-
tion date, the respective values of the transferred property and the 
consideration received for the transfer, which determine the propor-
tion of the property subject to the estate tax, would be those prevail-
ing at the time of the transfer. 
Although there is some judicial support for a proportional ap-
proach to section 2043,58 it is difficult to reconcile such an approach 
with. the language of that section. This difficulty increases when 
section 2043 is read against section 2040, which, as we shall see, ex-
58. Helvering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576, 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
311 U.S. 678 (1940). The opinion does not include a careful analysis of the controlling 
statutory language. 
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plicitly provides for a proportional treatment in those situations in 
which there is a transfer of jointly held property for insufficient 
consideration. Section 2043 is interpreted literally in the Regula-
tions so as to require the full value, at the date of death or alterna-
tive valuation date, of the property which was transferred for an 
insufficient consideration, less the consideration (apparently valued 
at the time of the transfer), to be included in the decedent's gross 
estate.50 Under the Regulations, any increases or decreases in the 
value of the transferred property are charged against the decedent's 
estate. It would seem to be more equitable to treat the part of the 
property proportionate to the value of the consideration for the 
transfer as transferred for an adequate consideration and to limit 
changes in value after the transfer to the remainder of the property. 
If the statute requires the rejection of a proportional approach, it 
still seems unfair to value the property transferred as of the date of 
the decedent's death or upon the alternate valuation date, while the 
consideration received for the transfer is valued as of the date of the 
transfer. In some cases this approach favors the taxpayer while in 
others it favors the government. However, these inequities do not 
offset each other, because different taxpayers will be involved in 
each case. The fact that the rule favors a taxpayer in one case is 
little consolation to another taxpayer who is prejudiced by its oper-
ation in a different case. For example, in the hypothetical case in 
the preceding paragraph, the Regulations (assuming valuation as 
of the date of death) would apparently require $175,000 to be in-
cluded in the decedent's gross estate; that is, his executor would be 
required to include $200,000, the value at the transferor's death of 
the transferred stock, less $25,000, the value at the time the transfer 
took place of the land received for the stock. Thus, even though 
$40,000 would be included in the decedent's gross estate if he con-
tinued to own the land at his death, his estate would be given 
credit for only $25,000, the value of the land at the time of the 
transfer. If the land decreased in value to $5,000 before the dece-
dent's death, the estate would still get credit for $25,000 according 
to the Treasury rule. In the latter situation, of course, the rule 
would be prejudicial to the government, since the estate would be 
allowed to subtract $25,000 from the value of the property trans-
ferred, although only $5,000 would be included in the gross estate 
with respect to the land received as consideration. It seems obvious 
that the only really fair rule would be a proportional rule by means 
59. Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-l(a) (1958); see Vardell's Estate v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 
688 (5th Cir. 1962). 
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of which a part of the transferred property equal to the value of the 
consideration received for the transfer would be excluded from the 
gross estate while the remainder of the transferred property, along 
with the consideration received at the time of the transfer, would 
be included in the gross estate, and be valued according to the ap-
propriate values at the death of the decedent or at the alternate 
valuation date. 
F. Annuities Taxable Under Section 2039 and Jointly 
Held Property 
The problems which may arise with respect to what is includible 
in a decedent's gross estate when a tax is imposed under sections 
2039 and 2040 involve basically an identification of what the de-
cedent transferred. Section 2039 taxes the value of payments to be 
made to a beneficiary when such payments are contingent upon the 
beneficiary surviving the decedent if, under the contract pursuant 
to which such payments are required, the decedent at his death was 
receiving or had the right to receive payments; however, such sur-
vivor benefits are taken into account only in proportion to the de-
cedent's contributions to the cost of the contract. Section 2040 taxes 
the value of jointly held property to the estate of a deceased joint 
tenant according to his contribution to the property. Both sections 
2039 and 2040, therefore, treat the decedent as having made a ta.x-
able transfer of a part of the property passing to the surviving bene-
ficiary or tenant proportionate to the decedent's contribution to the 
property. However, at this point the parallel between the two sec-
tions ceases. Indeed, the two sections apply quite different tests to 
determine the decedent's contribution. 
Under section 2040, a deceased joint tenant is treated as having 
contributed any part of the joint property or consideration for the 
joint property which originated with him and which was not ac-
quired from him for an adequate and full consideration in money 
or money's worth. For example, if A gave $10,000 to B as a birthday 
gift, and later B used the money to purchase Blackacre, B taking 
title in B and A as joint tenants, the full value of Blackacre would 
be includible in A's gross estate if he predeceased B. Since the 
money used to purchase Blackacre originated with A and was never 
obtained from him by B for an adequate consideration, A would 
be regarded under section 2040 as furnishing the entire consider-
ation for Blackacre. In contrast, section 2039 makes no provision 
for tracing in the annuity situation. Apparently as far as section 
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2039 is concerned, the decedent is deemed the contributor to the 
fund payable to the surviving beneficiary to the extent that he was 
the owner of the amounts paid to the fund at the time the payments 
were made. Section 2039 states that in the case of payments exempt 
from the estate tax under section 2039(c) in connection with a 
qualified pension, profit-sharing or stock bonus plan, contributions 
by the decedent's employer are not attributed to the decedent; just 
the opposite is true under the other provisions of section 2039 tax-
ing unqualified plans.60 Apart from this explicit reference to con-
tributions made by the decedent's employer, however, no rules are 
provided in section 2039 for determining the decedent's contribu-
tions. Presumably, the fact that an amount which eventually was 
contributed to an annuity fund originated with the decedent will 
not lead to its being imputed to him for tax purposes if he no 
longer owned it, either formally or substantially, at the time the 
contribution was actually made. For example, suppose that H gave 
W $100,000 as a wedding present. Some years later W invested this 
sum in a joint and survivor annuity for H and herself. If H pre-
deceases W, nothing will be included in his gross estate because of 
the annuity, because he made no contribution to the purchase of 
the annuity. If there was an express or implied understanding be-
tween H and W at the time of the gift that the money would be 
used to acquire a joint and survivor annuity, the annuity would 
probably be taxed to H's estate upon the theory that he really con-
tributed the consideration for the annuity.61 In the absence of any 
such understanding, there seems no way in which the consideration 
for the annuity can be traced to H. The situation under section 
2039 is reminiscent of the problems that arose in connection with 
the taxation of life insurance proceeds when the premium payment 
test prevailed. Before the 1954 Code, life insurance was included in 
the gross estate of the insured to the extent that the insured had 
paid the premiums for the insurance, even though it was payable 
to a beneficiary other than his estate and even though the insured 
had divested himself of all incidents of ownership in the insur-
ance. 62 The rule applied in determining who paid the premiums 
for insurance was that the premiums were deemed to be paid by 
the person who was the legal and beneficial owner of the amounts 
used to pay the premiums, even though he had received those 
60. In the case of an unqualified plan, § 2039(b) attributes to the decedent con-
tributions made by the decedent's employer "if made by reason of his employment." 
61. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-l(h)(2) (1958). 
62. INT. REv. ConE OF 1939, § 8ll(g}(2). 
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amounts from the insured, so long as there was no understanding 
which justified imputing the premium payments to the insured.63 
For example, if W took out insurance on her husband's life, re-
tained the incidents of ownership in the insurance, and paid the 
premiums with money given to her by her husband, which money 
she was free to use for any purpose she saw fit, the premium pay-
ments would not be attributed to the insured, nor would the in-
surance be taxed to his estate.64 Apparently this same type of test 
will prevail under section 2039 in the absence of an explicit pro-
vision for tracing such as that found in section 2040. If so, section 
2039 is free from problems of identification whatever its other 
frailties may be. 
A number of interesting questions are raised by the fact that 
jointly held property is traced to the tenant with whom the prop-
erty or the consideration for the property originated, except to the 
extent that the property or the consideration was acquired from 
him for an adequate and full consideration. Property acquired from 
a deceased joint tenant or tenant by the entirety for an adequate 
and full consideration is not, of course, attributed to the decedent. 
Thus, for example, if B purchased Blackacre from A for an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth, and if B 
then transferred the property to himself and A as joint tenants, 
Blackacre would be attributed entirely to B for estate tax purposes. 
However, if B acquired property from A for an insufficient consider-
ation, and later placed the property in A and himself as joint ten-
ants, and if A predeceased B, the statute attributes the property to 
the tenants on a proportionate basis.65 Thus, for example, suppose 
that A sold Blackacre to B for $25,000 when it was worth $100,000, 
and later B transferred the property to himself and A as joint ten-
ants. If A predeceases B and Blackacre is worth $200,000 at the time 
of A's death and at the alternate valuation date, $150,000 will be 
included in A's gross estate. Since the consideration which B paid 
A for Blackacre amounted to one-fourth of the then value of Black-
acre, A is treated as having transferred the remaining three-fourths 
of the property at his death. 
The process of tracing a decedent's contributions to jointly held 
property is complicated by the doctrine that any income from 
donated property, 'which income is contributed to the joint estate 
63. Treas. Reg. § 81.27(a) (1954). The Regulation, while recognizing the possibility 
of indirect payment, contains no hint of a tracing requirement. 
64. Estate of Albert D. Saunders, 14 T.C. 534 (1950); Estate of John E. Cain, Sr., 48 
B.T.A. 1133 (1941). 
65. !NT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2040; Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-l(c)(G) (1958). 
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by a donee, is treated as the donee's independent contribution and 
is not imputed to the original donor. 66 For example, if A gave 
bonds to B and if B used the interest from the bonds to acquire 
property to which he took title in himself and A, the full value of 
this property would be attributed to B under section 2040. How-
ever, the doctrine that income from donated property is attributed 
to the donee raises difficulties when it becomes necessary to define 
what constitutes such income. It seems fairly clear, at least to the 
Treasury, that an unrealized appreciation in the value of property 
in the hands of a donee is not income constituting an independent 
contribution by the donee.67 For example, suppose that A paid 
$10,000 for Blackacre and gave it to B when it was worth $20,000. 
Suppose further that when the property was worth $30,000 B trans-
ferred it to himself and A as joint tenants. If A predeceases B, the 
full value of Blackacre will be included in his gross estate upon the 
theory that he contributed the entire consideration for the property. 
It is not clear whether a gain must be recognized as well as real-
ized under the income tax sections of the Code in order for it to be 
imputed to a donee under section 2040. For example, suppose that 
in the hypothetical case in the preceding paragraph B exchanged 
Blackacre when it was worth $30,000 for Whiteacre, also worth 
$30,000, and that B later transferred Whiteacre to himself and A as 
joint tenants. If the exchange was a taxable exchange for purposes 
of the income tax, then the income realized by B on this exchange 
will be treated as his independent contribution to the joint estate 
for purposes of the estate tax. Suppose, however, that the exchange 
was a tax-free exchange under section I 031 so that any gain on the 
exchange was not recognized. It is not clear whether B will be re-
garded as having made any contribution to the joint estate. 
Another problem that arises here involves the extent to which 
income tax concepts should be carried over to the estate tax. In the 
hypothetical case in which B exchanged Blackacre for Whiteacre 
in a taxable exchange, B would realize an income tax gain of 
$20,000 even though Blackacre increased in value only to the extent 
of $10,000 while it was in his hands. This is so because in comput-
ing his gain from the exchange, B must use A's basis of $10,000 for 
Blackacre rather than a basis equal to the fair market value of the 
property at the time he received it ($20,000).68 Will the gain as 
66. Harvey v. United States, 185 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1950); Estate of Ralph Owen 
Howard, 9 T.C. 1192 (1947); Treas. Reg. § 2040-l(c)(5) (1958). 
67. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-l(c)(4) (1958). 
68. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 1015. 
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computed for income tax purposes or the gain which actually took 
place while Blackacre was in B's hands be used to determine the 
amount of B's contribution to the joint estate under section 2040? 
It would certainly simplify matters if income tax concepts were 
used in the estate tax analysis of this situation. This would mean, of 
course, that unless there was a gain recognized and taxed by the in-
come tax, there would be no contribution of income by a donee to 
a joint tenancy for estate tax purposes. Moreover, the income con-
tributed by the donee would be measured in terms of income re-
cognized under the income tax provisions rather than in terms of 
the actual gain occurring while the donee held the donated 
property. 69 
As we have already seen, the question whether income tax con-
cepts should be applied to joint estates for purposes of computing 
the estate tax may also a.rise in stock dividend cases.7° For example, 
suppose that A gave stock to B. Suppose also that B receives a stock 
dividend in connection with this stock and that B transfers this 
dividend to himself and A as joint tenants. Will the stock dividend 
be attributed to A or to B for estate tax purposes? If an income 
tax test is applied, the stock dividend will not be attributed to 
B (the donee) unless the dividend was taxable as income under 
the income tax. On the other hand, if the nature of the dividend for 
estate tax purposes is determined on the basis of the time when the 
earnings represented by the dividend were accumulated, the stock 
dividend will be attributed to B to the extent that it represents 
earnings accruing after the original stock transfer.71 The problem 
here is essentially the same as the one discussed earlier with respect 
to the general treatment of stock dividends under the estate tax. 72 
Like so many legal doctrines that are simpler in theory than 
69. However, what little authority there is on the point seems to indicate that the 
donee's contribution will be measured in terms of the actual appreciation of the 
donated property while it is in his hands, rather than in terms of the gain upon 
which he is taxed under the income tax provisions using as his basis the substituted 
basis of the donor. Swartz v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 540 (D. Mass. 1960). 
70. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. 
71. In the two cases that have raised this problem, Tuck v. United States, 282 F.2d 
405 (9th Cir. 1960), and English v. United States, 270 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1959), the 
courts were not required to choose between the income tax approach and the chrono-
logical earnings approach, since the earnings represented by the stock dividends had 
been accumulated by the corporations before the gifts. Consequently, they said that 
the stock dividends would be regarded as part of the property originally transferred 
by the decedent, since they were not income for income tax purposes and represented 
earnings existing at the time of the gifts. ·without definitely committing themselves 
the courts recognized the possibility of a different result under McGehee v. Commis-
sioner, 260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958), in the case of a stock dividend representing earn-
ings accumulated after the original gift. 
72. See text accompanying notes 18-32, supra. 
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they are in practice, the tracing of the contributions of joint tenants 
or tenants by the entirety into jointly owned property raises practi-
cal problems of proof as well as doctrinal difficulties. Thus, how do 
you trace contributions made by cotenants through a fund in which 
such contributions are commingled? For example, suppose that A 
purchased Blackacre for $20,000 and gave it to B when it was worth 
that amount. Suppose further that B sold the property for $40,000 
and deposited the proceeds of the sale in a bank account, from 
which he purchased Greenacre for $.20,000, to which he took title in 
his individual name, and, Whiteacre for $20,000, to which he took 
title in himself and A as joint tenants. To what extent will White-
acre be attributed to A and B for estate tax purposes? Obviously, it 
is impossible to determine whether A's $20,000 or B's $20,000 went 
into the purchase of Whiteacre. This must be settled by means of a 
presumption. A number of presumptions which could be adopted 
but which make no particular sense come to mind, such as first-in, 
first-out, or last-in, first-out, or that withdrawals were made from the 
commingled fund by B in the order which would minimize, or 
maximize, his estate tax. Perhaps the most equitable procedure in 
this situation would be to prorate any withdrawals from the fund in 
proportion to the respective contributions to the fund. According 
to this approach, since A and B each contributed half of the fund, 
the withdrawal from the fund which was used to purchase White-
acre (the jointly owned property) would be presumed to consist half 
of A's funds and half of B's funds, with the result that half of the 
common property would be attributed to each tenant for estate tax 
purposes. However, there is another approach which may be re-
quired by the statute. Section 2040 puts the burden of proving that 
jointly held property is not attributable to a deceased tenant upon 
the deceased tenant's estate. The logical corollary of this provision 
may be that any property purchased from a commingled fund will 
be deemed to have come from the decedent's contributions to the 
fund to the extent that the amount withdrawn from the fund to 
acquire the property did not exceed his contribution. According to 
this theory, in the hypothetical case all of Whiteacre would be 
attributed to A if he died first, or to B if he died first, since each 
one contributed $20,000 to the common fund, and the $20,000 used 
to purchase Whiteacre could have come entirely from either tenant's 
contribution. 73 
Even where it is clear what property each cotenant contributed 
to a joint estate, there may be difficulty in determining the amount 
73. Cf. Estate of Albert D. Saunders, 14 T.C. '534 (1950). 
138 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:105 
of their respective contributions for estate tax purposes if changes 
of value intervene between the contributions. For example, suppose 
that H purchased Blackacre for $10,000 and when the property was 
worth $20,000 he transferred it to himself and W as tenants by the 
entirety. When the property had increased in value to $30,000, W 
built a house upon Blackacre at a cost of $30,000, which came en-
tirely from her own funds. What are the respective contributions of 
H and W to the common property? It seems clear that the amount 
contributed by a joint tenant is not his cost or other basis for the 
contributed property, but the fair market value of the property. But 
as of what date is this fair market value to be determined? Is it the 
fair market value when the joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety 
is created or when the other cotenant contributed to the property? 
Under the former assumption H contributed $20,000 to the com-
mon estate while W contributed $30,000, that is, H contributed two-
fifths and W contributed three-fifths of the property. Under the 
latter assumption, however, both H and W will have contributed 
$30,000, so that each will be deemed to have contributed one-half of 
the property. The estate tax Regulations offer no guidance upon 
this point. Under the gift tax Regulations, appreciation in jointly 
held property is treated as additional consideration attributable to 
the one who furnished the original consideration.74 Thus, applying 
the gift tax Regulations, H's contribution in the hypothetical case 
would be $30,000, and he would be deemed to have contributed 
one-half of the common property. However, it is by no means 
certain that the gift tax Regulations are a proper construction of 
the statute, or that they can be transposed to the estate tax situation. 
Ill. To WHAT EXTENT MAY PROPERTY TRANSFERRED BY A 
DECEDENT BE TRACED INTO OTHER PROPERTY? 
Property transferred by means of a taxable inter vivas transfer 
must be valued for estate tax purposes according to its fair market 
value at the date of the decedent's death75 or the alternate valuation 
date.76 The fact that property transferred at one time must be 
valued according to its fair market value at a different time presents 
74:. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-l(c)(2), Example (1) (1958). This approach often requires 
modification in practice as indicated in Example (3) of the same Regulation. 
75. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954:, § 2031. 
76. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954:, § 2032. It has been argued that a complete inter vivos 
transfer must be valued according to its value at the date of the transfer rather than 
the transferor's death and that to value it otherwise would be unconstitutional. This 
argument was rejected in Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704: (5th Cir. 1935), and 
there seems to be no doubt that property transferred inter vivos will be valued in the 
same way as property transferred by will or intestacy. 
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a puzzling problem of identifying the property to be valued if the 
transferred property is converted into other property between the 
date of the transfer and the date of the decedent's death. For ex-
ample, suppose that A gives Blackacre to B in contemplation of 
death and dies within three years of the gift. Before A's death, B 
exchanges Blackacre for Whiteacre which he owns at A's death. Will 
the value of Blackacre or the value of Whiteacre be included in A's 
gross estate? There is little authority on this point, which may be 
attributed to the fact that most inter vivas transfers that are taxed 
under the estate tax consist of transfers in trust, and whenever there 
is a transfer in trust the doctrine is fairly well settled that the prop-
erty to be included in the transferor's gross estate is the property 
held under the trust at the date of his death rather than the property 
originally transferred to the trust.77 However, it is a little difficult 
to see how a transfer in trust presents a problem any different from 
that of an outright transfer, since the statute provides that the prop-
erty interests transferred by the decedent shall be included in his 
gross estate, and since the trust does not arise until after the transfer. 
If the decedent transferred an interest existing in a trust, there 
would be reason to say that he had transferred a beneficial interest 
in the trust res rather than any specific property. However, if he 
transfers property to a trustee the identification problem is not con-
ceptually different from that presented in the case of an outright 
transfer.78 However, the fiction that when there is a transfer in 
trust the interest transferred is the trust res rather than any specific 
trust property is so convenient79 that it is unlikely anyone will feel 
called upon to challenge it strenuously. 
77. This seems to be the Treasury practice although there is not much support for 
it in the cases. l\lONTGOll[ERY, FEDERAL TAXES-EsrATES, TRUSTS AND GIFTS (1949-1950) 
589-94 (1950); Barrett, Valuation for Estate Tax Purposes of Property Transferred 
in Contemplation of Death, When Property Is Disposed of or Changes Form Prior to 
Death, N.Y.U. 9rn ANN. INST. ON FED. TAXATION 141, 142-46 (1951); Pavenstedt, Taxa-
tion of Transfers in Contemplation of Death: A Proposal for Abolition, 54- YALE L.J. 
70, 87-90 (1944); Young, Proposed Estate Tax Regulations, 95 TRUSTS &: EsrATES 1080, 
1082 (1956). This was also the result, at least, in Igleheart v. Commissioner, supra note 
76 and Estate of B. H. Kroger, 12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1237 (1943), aff d, 145 F.2d 901 (6th 
Cir. 1944). 
78. Pavenstedt, supra note 77, at 88, 89, criticizes the distinction drawn by 
the Treasury between an outright transfer in contemplation of death, where the 
property originally transferred must be included in the decedent's gross estate, and a 
transfer in trust, where the substituted property held by the trustee at the decedent's 
death is included in the gross estate, as lacking any foundation in principle. The 
same position is taken by Barrett, supra note 77, at 143, and Young, supra note 77, 
at 1082. 
79. However, as Pavenstedt, supra note 77, at 90 points out: 
This may be all very well from the standpoint of facilitating the collection of 
revenue, but will often work out most unfairly from the taxpayer's point of view. 
For example, assume that decedent transferred in contemplauon of death $100,000 
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If there is an outright inter vivas transfer taxable under the 
estate tax, the statute provides that the property transferred shall be 
included in the decedent's gross estate. In the case of a transfer in 
contemplation of death where the transfer is complete at the time it 
is made, the property includible in the decedent's gross estate is 
apparently the original property transferred by the decedent rather 
than some other property into which the original property may be 
converted before the transferee's death.80 Thus, in the hypothetical 
case in which A gave Blackacre to B in contemplation of death and 
before A's death B exchanged Blackacre for Whiteacre, it would 
appear under the literal wording of the statute that the value of 
Blackacre would be included in A's gross estate. The only way to 
escape this conclusion is to regard the interest transferred by A as 
the original property or its product. Although this might reach a 
desirable result, it is unwarranted in light of the statutory lan-
guage. 81 
The identification problem which arises when there is a transfer 
in contemplation of death and the form of the property transferred 
changes before the decedent's death, is unlikely to arise in connec-
tion with the taxes on inter vivas transfers imposed under other 
sections of the statute. Most of the transfers taxable under these 
sections will be transfers in trust, and, as such, the property includi-
ble in the gross estate will be the trust res as of the decedent's death. 
worth of prime bonds outright to his son and the same amount of such bonds 
to a trustee for the benefit of his daughter. The son and the trustee both sell 
the bonds and reinvest in, say, Kreuger & Toll, which is worthless at date of 
death. Under the Bureau's practices nothing will be included in the gross 
estate because of the trust fund, but $100,000 will be included by reason of the 
outright gift. 
Moreover, the adoption of the trust fund theory does not eliminate all administrative 
problems. For example, suppose that there is a transfer to a trustee in contemplation 
of death and the trustee is given power to invade the corpus of the trust in behalf 
of the income beneficiary, which he does to the extent of half of the trust fund 
before the grantor's death. It would seem that the part of the trust property paid 
over to the income beneficiary from the principal of the trust would have to be 
included in the decedent's gross estate as well as the property left in the trust at his 
death. Suppose that before the decedent's death the beneficiary spent this property 
for his support. What would be included in the decedent's gross estate? Or suppose 
that the beneficiary exchanged the property distributed to him by the trustee for 
other property before the decedent's death. Would the property distributed to the 
beneficiary or the substitute property held by him at the decedent's death be 
included in the decedent's gross estate? 
80. Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1947). Pavenstedt, 
Barrett, and Young in the articles cited in note 77 supra, state that this is the Trea-
sury practice. 
81. However, in Estate of B. H. Kroger, 12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1237 (1943), affd, 
145 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1944), the Tax Court said that where there is a transfer in 
contemplation of death the same rule applies to trusts and outright gifts; in both 
cases the amount includible in the gross estate is the value of the substituted prop-
erty held by the transferee at the transferor's death. 
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Thus, for example, most revocable transfers taxable under section 
2038 will take the form of transfers in trust. 82 The same thing is apt 
to be true of transfers taxable as transfers taking effect at death 
under section 2037, and to a somewhat lesser extent, of transfers 
with a retained life interest taxable under section 2036. If there is 
an outright transfer, the fact that the transferred property must 
meet certain conditions at the transferor's death should serve to 
identify the property includible in the decedent's gross estate. For 
example, if A transferred Blackacre to B and retained a life estate 
in Blackacre, the fact that B exchanged his remainder in Blackacre 
for Whiteacre before A's death should not prevent Blackacre from 
being included in A's gross estate. 
It is not quite clear how a taxable inter vivos transfer of money 
will be treated. Presumably if there is an outright transfer this will 
be regarded as a transfer of a certain amount of money and this 
amount will be included in the transferor's gross estate, irrespective 
of what happens to the money after the transfer.83 Thus if A trans-
ferred $100,000 to B in contemplation of death, it would seem that 
$100,000 should be included in A's gross estate, regardless of 
whether B loses the $100,000 after the transfer but before A's death 
or invests it in stock which increases greatly before A dies. If money 
is transferred in trust, however, it is possible that the usual doctrine, 
namely that the property transferred is the trust res as it exists at the 
transferor's death, will prevail, and the property in which the money 
is invested at the decedent's death will be included in his gross 
estate. As noted previously, it is difficult to find a doctrinal justifica-
tion for the distinction between outright transfers and transfers to a 
trust, particularly if the only reason for taxing the transfer is that it 
was made in contemplation of death.84 
82. But see Howard v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. La. 1941), modified, 
125 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942). 
83. In Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1947), the decedent 
transferred $40,000 in cash to his sons, who lost half of that amount before his death. 
The court held that the $40,000 originally transferred by tke decedent had to be 
included in his gross estate. Pavenstedt, supra note 77, at 87, 88 says: 
If the gift is made in cash, its value at the date of the gift is taken as the value at 
the date of death, regardless of whether it has been kept in a safe deposit box, 
destroyed by fire, profitably invested or squandered. There do not seem to be any 
cases on this point [the article was written before the decision in Humphrey's 
Estate v. Commissioner] but it is understood that a few administrative settlements 
have been made on this basis. 
84. It might be argued that this distinction should be abandoned in the case of a 
transfer of cash, with the result that in both cases the amount of cash originally 
transferred would be included in the transferor's gross estate, regardless of what 
happened to the cash after the transfer. This would, of course, introduce further 
complications where the decedent made transfers of both cash and other property to 
the same trustee. 
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JV. CONCLUSION 
[Vol. 65:105 
No attempt has been made in this article to present a compre-
hensive review of all of the problems that may arise in the process 
of identifying property subject to the federal estate tax. The authors 
hope, however, they have made it clear that there is a problem here 
which merits more consideration than it has received from the 
people who make and talk about tax law. A prodigious amount of 
effort has been expended in delineating the transfers that are tax-
able under the statute. It may now be time to tum our attention to 
intensive investigation of what should be included in the gross 
estate when there is a taxable transfer. This is an area of consider-
able uncertainty. Two methods of dealing with the uncertainty seem 
obvious: one is to stand by passively in the hope that the statutory 
ambiguities will eventually be resolved by the courts; another is to 
seek Congressional clarification of the statute. It is interesting to 
speculate what might be done along this second line. 
The problem whether income accumulated in connection with 
an inter vivos transfer should be included in the gross estate of the 
transferor could be resolved by amending the statute to provide ex-
plicitly for the taxation of such income except for income accumu-
lated in connection with an indefeasible transfer in contemplation 
of death. This would mean that income accumulated in connection 
with transfers taxable under sections 2036, 2037, and 2038 would be 
covered for estate tax purposes provided that the accumulated in-
come satisfied all the conditions, except the requirement of a trans-
fer by the decedent, required for a tax under those sections. The 
basis of the tax would be that the retention of the same control 
over income which justifies a tax upon the principal producing the 
income is a sufficient reason for taxing the accumulated income. 
As we have seen, there is apparently no satisfactory judicial solu-
tion to the problem whether stock dividends and other corporate 
distributions should. be regarded for estate tax purposes as part of 
the stock originally transferred by a decedent, to be included in his 
gross estate, or as income accruing after the transfer, to be excluded 
from his gross estate. Applying the income tax tests for determining 
this issue to the estate tax situation is not particularly satisfactory 
because a dividend may be treated as income under the income tax 
although it actually represents part of the original stock in connec-
tion with which the dividend was distributed. It makes sense to treat 
dividends as part of the stock originally transferred when the divi-
dends represent earnings accumulated before the transfer, although 
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under this approach the practical difficulty of determining the 
source of the dividends is encountered. The standard adopted by the 
Regulations for distinguishing a dividend which represents a divi-
sion of capital from an income dividend according to whether the 
dividend essentially alters the character of the original stock as it 
existed at the time of the transfer, is a satisfactory expression of an 
objective but is not especially useful as a practical test. Perhaps the 
best solution is to lay down a legislative rule of thumb which will 
achieve approximate justice. Thus it might be wise to amend the 
statute by providing that to the extent that dividends distributed 
by a corporation within a reasonable period, such as any one calen-
dar year, do not exceed 10 per cent of the value of stock at the time 
it was transferred, such dividends shall not be regarded as part of 
the property originally transferred.85 Any distribution in excess of 
that amount would be treated as part of the property originally 
transferred and would therefore be included in the transferor's gross 
estate or otherwise taken into account as property of the decedent. 
From the viewpoint of sound tax policy, few people have the 
temerity to challenge the proposition that a decedent should not be 
able to diminish his taxable estate by a transfer in contemplation of 
death. In view of the ambiguity which now exists as to the amount 
taxable when a decedent transfers or releases in contemplation of 
death a taxable incident of a transfer which is covered by the estate 
tax provisions, the statute should be amended to provide expressly 
that the transfer or release should be disregarded and that the same 
amount should be included in the decedent's gross estate as would 
have been included had the transfer or release not taken place. The 
statute might also specify the consequences which would follow 
from the receipt of consideration for such a transfer or release. This 
will mean, of course, that if a decedent gratuitously releases a re-
tained life estate or a reversionary interest in contemplation of 
death, he will be taxed under section 2036 or section 2037 upon the 
same amount he would have been taxed upon if the release had not 
taken place. This result has already been achieved under the lan-
guage of section 2038 in connection with a release in contemplation 
of death of a power taxable under section 2038. Section 2040 should 
be similarly amended so that a transfer in contemplation of death 
by a joint tenant or a tenant by the entirety of his interest in the 
joint property will not diminish the amount includible in his gross 
estate. 
85. Cf. Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, ch. 7(B) (1953), attempting to dif-
ferentiate between stock dividends and stock splits. 
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The fact that property transferred at one date must be valued 
at another date for estate tax purposes may raise a serious identifica-
tion question if the form of the property changes between the two 
dates. Although the problem looks formidable, the only really diffi-
cult situation appears to be when there is an outright transfer in 
contemplation of death. It might be wise to amend the statute to 
provide that in the above situation the amount includible in the 
decedent's gross estate shall be the value of the property at the time 
of the inter vivos transfer rather than its value at a later date. This 
would eliminate any problem which might arise in connection with 
the identification of the property includible in the gross estate. 
Moreover, if the decedent irrevocably parted with the property 
when he made the lifetime transfer, there is no compelling policy 
reason for charging his estate with subsequent changes in the value 
of the property. If the purpose of the tax on transfers in contempla-
tion of death is to prevent a decedent from changing his situation 
under the estate tax by means of such a transfer, it is logical to say 
that the decedent should be treated as though he had never made 
the transfer and had retained the transferred property until his 
death. The corollary to this proposition is that the value of the 
property originally transferred, determined at the date of the trans-
feror's death or at the alternate valuation date, should be included 
in his gross estate. However, the price which must be paid for this 
logic is complexity and confusion, and the ideal of disregarding the 
transfer in contemplation of death seems to be sufficiently preserved 
by restoring to the decedent's gross estate the value withdrawn at 
the time of the transfer rather than charging the decedent's estate 
with whatever happened to the property after he parted with it com-
pletely. This suggestion is quite consistent with the current settled 
principle pursuant to which any post-transfer income is excluded 
from the gross estate in the case of transfers in contemplation of 
death. 
